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Comment
Redefining Community Standards in Light of the
Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet: A Critique of
United States v. Thomas
Erik G. Swenson*
Robert and Carleen Thomas operated the Amateur Action
Computer Bulletin Board System (AABBS) from their home in
California in 1991.1 AABBS contained approximately 14,000
sexually explicit pictures stored in Graphic Interchange Format
(GIF) files.2 Paying members could download these pictures to
a personal computer from anywhere in the world via electronic
access.' In July 1993, a United States Postal Inspector4 re-
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. Engi-
neering 1992, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.S. Engineering 1991,
Marquette University.
1. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996). The AABBS was a computer bulletin board system
that operated through the use of telephones, modems, and personal computers
from the defendants' home in Milpitas, California. The system included e-mail,
chat lines, public messages, and files that members could download to their
own computers and printers. See id.
2. See id. The defendants bought various sexually explicit magazines
and books from public adult book stores in California. The defendants then
used an electronic scanner to convert pictures from the magazines and books
into computer files called Graphic Interchange Format files, commonly known
as "GIF" files. Members could download and view the GIF files from personal
computers anywhere in the world. The defendants also purchased, sold, and
delivered sexually explicit videotapes to AABBS members. Customers or-
dered the tapes by sending the defendants an e-mail message, and the defen-
dants sent the tapes to the customers via the United Parcel Service. See id.
3. See id. Nonmembers could view introductory screens that contained
brief, sexually explicit descriptions of the GIF files and adult videotapes that
were offered for sale to members. AABBS limited access to the GIF files to
members who were given a password after they paid a $55 membership fee
and submitted a signed application form to the defendants. The application
form requested the age, address, and telephone number of the applicant. The
form also required the applicants signature. Members accessed the GIF files
by using a telephone, modem, and a personal computer. The defendants' tele-
phone modem answered the incoming calls. Once the system verified the
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ceived a complaint regarding the AABBS from an individual
who resided in the Western District of Tennessee.' Using an
assumed name, the inspector sent in fifty-five dollars along
with a signed application form to AABBS.6 The inspector then
used his password to log on and download sexually explicit GIF
files that depicted "images of bestiality, oral sex, incest, sado-
masochistic abuse, and sex scenes involving urination."7 On
January 25, 1994, a federal grand jury for the Western District
of Tennessee returned a twelve-count indictment of federal ob-
scenity charges arising from the Thomas's operation of their
computer bulletin board business. 8 In the first federal prose-
user's password, members could select, retrieve, and instantly download GIF
files to their own computers. A user could then view the "GIF" files on his
own computer and print a copy. The GIF files contained the AABBS name
and access telephone number. See id.
4. Jurisdiction for offenses committed using the U.S. Mail Service falls
under the U.S. Postal Inspector. See 39 C.F.R. § 233 (1996). The defendants
in Thomas came under the United States Postal Inspector's jurisdiction because
access to the AABBS required users to mail a physical application and $55.
See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705.
5. See id. The inspector dialed the AABBS telephone number. He viewed
the introductory screen, which read "Welcome to AABBS, the Nastiest Place
on Earth." Id. He then read the graphic descriptions of the GIF files and the
videotapes that AABBS offered for sale. See id.
6. See id. Defendant called the inspector at his undercover telephone
number in Tennessee, verified receipt of the application, and then authorized
him to log-on with his password. See id.
7. Id. The inspector ordered six sexually explicit videotapes from the
AABBS and received them via United Parcel Service at a Memphis, Tennes-
see address. The inspector also had several e-mail and chat-mode conversa-
tions with the defendants. See id. Based on the evidence the inspector ac-
quired, a U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of California issued
a search warrant for AABBS headquarters on January 10, 1994. See id. The
authorities subsequently searched AABBS and seized its computer system.
See id.
8. See id. at 705-06. The twelve-count indictment charged the defen-
dants with the following criminal violations: one count for conspiracy to vio-
late federal obscenity laws under 18 U.S.C. § 371; six counts for knowingly
using and causing to be used a facility and means of interstate commerce un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 1465; three counts for shipping obscene videotapes via U.P.S.
under 18 U.S.C. § 1462; one count of causing the transportation of materials
depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct under 18 U.S:C. § 2252
(a)(1); and one count of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1467. See id. at 706. 18
U.S.C. § 1465 provides:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for
the purpose of sale or distribution, or knowingly travels in interstate
commerce, or uses a facility or means of interstate commerce for the
purpose of transporting obscene material in interstate or foreign
commerce, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet,
picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure,
image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other
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cution of a computer bulletin board operator for obscenity,9 a jury
found both Robert and Carleen Thomas guilty."° Defendants
appealed the decision and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
afrmed the district court's decision."
In United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals became the first court to consider whether the on-line
distribution of materials required a national standard rather
than a local one for purposes of judging materials obscene under
an established "contemporary community standards" test.12
The case sought to balance the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech against the legal and moral convictions of
society against obscenity.
This Comment contends that the definition of "community"
used to determine what constitutes obscenity should be rede-
fined to address the geographic limitlessness of the Internet.13
article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or
immoral character, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
9. See First Conviction for Obscenity on the Internet, THE COMPUTER
LAW., Sept. 1994, at 29, 29.
10. The jury found Robert Thomas guilty on eleven of the counts and
Carleen Thomas guilty on ten of the counts. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706.
Robert and Carleen Thomas were sentenced to 37 and 30 months of incar-
ceration, respectively. See id. The jury also concluded that the defendants'
computer system should be forfeited to the United States. See id.
11. See id. at 705.
12. Id. at 710. See generally infra Part I.B (discussing community stan-
dards as they relate to obscenity). The defendants asserted that their conduct
did not constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465. They argued that Congress
did not intend to regulate computer transmissions because the statute does
not expressly prohibit such conduct. Furthermore, they claimed to have a
constitutionally protected right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of
their home. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706-15. The defendants also argued
venue was improper, and that the case should have been transferred to Cali-
fornia. See id. at 709. Specifically, the defendants argued that they did not
cause the GIF files to be transmitted to the Western District of Tennessee;
rather, it was the postal inspector who, without their knowledge, accessed and
downloaded the GIF files and caused them to enter Tennessee's jurisdiction.
See id. Finally, the defendants challenged the propriety of the jury instruc-
tions, admission of certain evidence and sentencing, as well as competence of
their counsel See id.
13. It is unclear whether AABBS was a modem-based BBS or an Internet-
based BBS. See id. at 711 (noting amicus curiae argument that cyberspace
requires a new definition of "community"). Since both forms of BBSes have the
same type of features, and most modern BBSes are linked through the Internet,
this Comment assumes an Internet-based BBS. Defendant's arguments sup-
port this assumption. Even if this assumption is incorrect, the arguments set
forth in this Comment apply to future cases involving Internet-based BBSes.
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Part I provides an overview of the current state of First
Amendment jurisprudence and the United States Supreme
Court's definition of what constitutes obscenity. Part II sum-
marizes the holding and reasoning in Thomas. Part I ana-
lyzes the failure of the Thomas court to address the uniqueness
of the Internet in defining the relevant "community" for assessing
obscenity. Finally, this Comment proposes that the geographic
limitlessness of the Internet demands that "community" be re-
defined to a national standard for Internet-related cases,
rather than a local one. A national standard better recognizes
that the Internet "community" is made up of users without re-
gard to geographic boundaries. A national standard further
rectifies the shortcomings of the current standard by eliminat-
ing use of the lowest-common-denominator standard and by
eliminating forum shopping by federal prosecutors.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET AND OBSCENITY LAW
A. THE INTERNET
In recent years, the world has witnessed an explosive
growth in the use of computer bulletin boards 4 and networks
as means of communication. 5 The Internet is the world's larg-
est information network,16 consisting of over six million host
14. "Computer bulletin board" means any computer system that is both
accessed remotely by users and administered by an operator capable of limit-
ing access to the system and establishing guidelines for its use. See EDWARD
A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND
DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 3-4 (1994) (discussing bulletin board systems,
the Internet, and the law). Users can access databases, download files, leave
messages, and engage in chat sessions. See Eric Schlechter, Note, Cyberspace,
the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differ-
ences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMm. & ENT. L.J.
87, 90 (1993) (describing the functions of a BBS). Bulletin board systems are
inexpensive to create and easy to maintain. See id. at 91.
15. Computer networks are systems of interconnected computers linked
together via telephone lines and relatively simple communications software
for the purpose of sharing information between users. See CAVAZOS & MORIN,
supra note 14, at 4. Computer bulletin boards can be part of a network, and a
user on a computer connected to a network can communicate with users on
other systems connected to the network or access files or other features on
other networked systems. See Schlechter, supra note 14, at 90.
16. The Internet began in the 1960s with the connection of four strategically
important sites in the event of a nuclear war. See Robert L. Dunne, Deterring
Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace
Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 2 (1994). This
original defense-orientated network was made out of a peculiar architecture
[Vol. 82:855
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computers 17 and forty-nine million users from over ninety-six
countries. 18 The Internet continues to grow at a rate of ap-
proximately one million users each month.19
The Internet is made up of host computers, access services,
and individual users.2 0 Host computers store a vast amount of
information on almost every imaginable topic.2 1 Individual users
access the Internet remotely through the use of personal com-
puters, modems, and telephone lines.' The information on the
Internet passes from user to user and network to network
without any central data location and without any governing
authority. 3 "Information flow on the Internet resembles that
of a river, highway, or circulatory system: local networks fun-
nel information traffic into larger regional networks, which in
that made it especially susceptible to development into today's World Wide
Web. See 24 Hours in Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 21, 1996,
at 70, 70. The Internet quickly expanded to include universities, corporate
entities, and governments world-wide. See Meredith Leigh Friedman, Note,
Keeping Sex Safe on the Information Superhighway: Computer Pornography
and the First Amendment, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1996). Several
commercial on-line services were quick to follow, offering users a variety of
communications applications such as e-mail, Internet Relay Chat, and access
to the Internet. See id. at 1028. The Internet is a connection of thousands of
smaller, independent networks that utilize compatible communications standards
to exchange data. See Patrick T. Egan, Note, Virtual Community Standards:
Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standards of
Cyberspace?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 125 (1996) (citing KEIKO PrI'ER ET
AL., EVERY STUDENT'S GUEDE TO THE INTERNET 5-6 (1995)).
17. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S.
Ct. 2329 (1997).
18. See NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Part 2): Hearings on H.R.
2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Judiciary Comm. 104th Cong. 278 (1996) (statement of William J. Cook, at-
torney) [hereinafter Hearings on NIl Copyright Protection Act]. Commerce on
the Internet was estimated at $2.2 billion last year and is expected to increase
to $45.8 billion by the year 2000. See Catherine Yang, Law Creeps onto the
Lawless Net, BUS. WK., May 6, 1996, at 58.
19. See Mark L. Gordon, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information Super-
highway, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 182 (1995). The In-
ternet has an annual growth rate of 175%. See Hearings on NIl Copyright
Protection Act, supra note 18, at 278.
20. See generally CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 14, at 1-5 (discussing
components of cyberspace).
21 See Gordon, supra note 19, at 180.
22. See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing mechanics of
access to cyberspace).
23. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real
World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197, 201
(1995). Access can be gained from a multitude of different points. See id.
859
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
turn are connected to high capacity 'backbone' linkages."24 The
Internet allows virtually free exchange of vast amounts of in-
formation between any number of parties without regard to
time, distance, or geographic borders. 2  A network user com-
municates with other users in the same city as easily as with
users on other continents. 26 Users are normally unable to de-
termine the identity or the location of those they have con-
tacted.27
One of the fastest growing areas on the Internet involves
newsgroups and bulletin boards specializing in pornography.28
Pornography on the Internet contains digitized images, movies,
and sexually explicit text.29 Internet users from around the
world can post pornographic material to bulletin boards, 0 while
other users can view and selectively download this material in-
stantaneously without the bulletin board operator knowing
who is accessing the board or where the user is located.31 In-
deed, even if they wanted to, bulletin board operators could not
selectively block out users from accessing the bulletin boards 2
24. Dan L. Burk, Transborder Intellectual Property Issues on the Elec-
tronic Frontier, 6 STAN. L. & POLi REv. 9, 10 (1994).
25. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 180. Further development of the Inter-
net will change "forever the way people live, work, and interact with each
other" as more and more people access the vast network of information to
communicate, bank, invest, buy, sell, or entertain themselves. Id. Internet
users can access numerous services, including e-mail, discussion groups, in-
teractive classes, magazines, and newspapers. See Cynthia L. Counts & C.
Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability
and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALE. L. REV. 1083, 1086
(1996) (addressing the ease of access and distribution of information on the
Internet).
26. See Counts & Martin, supra note 25, at 1086.
27. See id.
28. See Suzanne Stefanac, Sex and the New Media, THE RECORDER, Sept.
8, 1993, at 8. Event Horizons, one of the largest adult bulletin boards, has
over 35,000 users and annual revenues in the millions. See id.
29. See CAVAZOS & MORIN, supra note 14, at 90-92.
30. A user posting to a newsgroup reaches millions of users throughout
the world. See Frederick B. Lim, Obscenity and Cyberspace: Community
Standards in an On-Line World, COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291, 295 (1996).
The Internet provides individual users with distribution capabilities rivaling
that of the largest media corporations. See id.
3L See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845-48 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117
S. Ct. 2329 (1997); Shea v. Reno 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd mem.
117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
32. See id.
[Vol. 82:855
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF SPEECH AND OBSCENITY
1. First Amendment and Historical Treatment of Obscenity
The founders of our country placed a high value on freedom
of expression.33 The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... -3 Despite
the First Amendment's literal protections, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that certain classes of speech are not protected by
the Constitution.35 These non-protected classes include the
"lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'ighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."36
Most states have laws prohibiting the distribution of obscene
33. A 1774 letter of the Continental Congress stated that:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press.
The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth,
science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal senti-
ments on the administration of Government, its ready communication
of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union
among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated,
into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (citing 1 Journals of the Con-
tinental Congress 108 (1774)). "Those who won our independence.., valued
liberty both as an end and as a means.... They believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political trth .... [IThe remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). "[A] democracy cannot long survive un-
less the people are provided the information needed to form judgments on is-
sues that affect their ability to intelligently govern themselves." Edwards v.
National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1977).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This protection has been applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Board of
Ed., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pica, 457 U.S. 853, 855, n. 1
(1982) (holding school officials may not remove books from school libraries for
the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives
discussed in the books); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244
(1936) (finding Louisiana's imposition of a tax on newspaper advertising is un-
constitutional under the Due Process Clause because it abridges the freedom
of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (finding a New
York law prohibiting anyone from publishing anything advocating, advising,
or teaching that organized government should be overthrown by force, vio-
lence, or any unlawful means was in violation of the First Amendment).
35. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(finding certain classes of speech not protected by the Constitution).
36. Id. at 572.
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material,37 and several federal laws are aimed at reducing ob-
scenity.38
In Roth v. United States,39 the Supreme Court addressed
the protections afforded obscenity under the First Amendment
for the first time. Roth was convicted for mailing obscene cir-
culars and advertisements and for mailing an obscene book in
violation of a federal obscenity statute.40 The defendants argued
the statutes in question did not provide reasonably ascertainable
standards of guilt and, therefore, violated the constitutional
requirement of due process. 41 The Court rejected this argu-
ment and held "obscenity is not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech or press."42 The Court reasoned that
37. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 1988) (prohibiting distribu-
tion of obscene material); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1991) (prohibiting
distribution of obscene material).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994) (prohibiting the mailing of obscene
or crime-inciting materials); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 407, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (prohibiting importation or transpor-
tation of obscene materials); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (prohibiting the broad-
casting of obscene language); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 407, 110 Stat. 56 (1995) (prohibiting transportation of obscene
material for sale or distribution); 18 U.S.C. § 1466 (1994) (prohibiting engag-
ing in the business of selling or transferring obscene material); 18 U.S.C. §
1468 (1994) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material by cable or subscrip-
tion television); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§
402, 561, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (prohibiting obscene or harassing communica-
tions in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications).
39. 354 U.S. 476, 476 (1957).
40. See id. at 480. Roth's New York business published and sold books,
photographs, and magazines. Roth used circulars and advertising to solicit
sales. See id.
4L See id. at 491. The thrust of the argument is that the statutes were
vague. See id.; see also infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing
vagueness).
42. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. "[Tihe Constitution does not require impossible
standards; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices.'" Id. at 491 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)). The Court noted that the guarantees of free-
dom of expression in effect in the colonies when the founders ratified the Con-
stitution in 1792 gave no absolute protection for every utterance. See Id. at
482. The colonies allowed prosecution of libel, blasphemy, profanity, and ob-
scenity. See id. at 482-83. The Court reasoned that because these crimes
were not protected, the founders did not intend for the First Amendment to
protect every utterance. See id. at 483. "At the time of the adoption of the
First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but
there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too,
was outside the protection intended for speech and press." Id. According to
the Court, the First Amendment protection was intended to assure
"unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
[Vol. 82:855
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obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social importance."43
The Court defined obscene material as that "which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."' The Court
further stated the test for obscenity was defined by "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest." s The Court did not define
"contemporary community standards" until several years
later.46
The dissent in Roth argued the Court's obscenity test gave
too much discretion to the local communities and resulted in
unconstitutional censorship. 47 The Roth test allows juries to
punish speech or publication that has an undesirable impact
on thoughts even if the speech or action is not unlawful.48 This
changes desired by the people." Id. at 484.
43. Id. at 484. This view is reflected in an international agreement
among over 50 nations. See Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation
of Obscene Publications, May 4, 1910, 37 Stat. 1511 (describing the proce-
dures that each nation will implement to limit the circulation of obscenity). It
is reflected in the obscenity laws of the states. See Hearings Before Subcomm.
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 49-52 (1955) (identifying obscenity laws in forty-eight states). It
is reflected in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to
1956. See 70 Stat. 699, 699-700 (1956); 69 Stat. 183, 183-84 (1955); 64 Stat.
451, 451 (1950); 64 Stat. 194, 194 (1950); 62 Stat. 683, 768-69 (1948); 48 Stat.
1064, 1091 (1934); 46 Stat. 590, 688-89 (1930); 41 Stat. 1060, 1060-61 (1920);
35 Stat. 1088, 1129, 1138 (1909); 33 Stat. 705, 705 (1905); 29 Stat. 512, 512
(1897); 26 Stat. 567, 614-615 (1890); 25 Stat. 496, 496 (1888); 25 Stat. 187, 188
(1888); 19 Stat. 90, 90 (1876); 17 Stat. 598, 598 (1873); 17 Stat. 283, 302
(1872); 13 Stat. 504, 507 (1865); 11 Stat. 168, 168 (1857); 5 Stat. 548, 566-67
(1842); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465, 1718; 39 U.S.C. §§ 259a, 259b (1958). "It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality." Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
44. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
45. Id. at 489 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Implicit in the com-
munity standards approach is the notion that a "community" relies upon the
physical proximity of its members. See Lim, supra note 30, at 294.
46. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
47. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
concluded that the standard the Court adopted conflicted with the First
Amendmentes guarantee that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." See id. at 511-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 509.
The legality of a publication in this country should never be allowed
to turn either on the purity of thought which it instills in the mind of
the reader or on the degree to which it offends the community con-
science. By either test the role of the censor is exalted, and society's
values in literary freedom are sacrificed.
863
864 MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 82:855
drastically curtails the protections of the First Amendment.
"The danger of influencing a change in the current moral stan-
dards of the community, or of shocking or offending readers, or
of stimulating sexual thoughts or desires apart from objective
conduct, can never justify the losses to society that result from
interference with literary freedom."
49
In 1964, the Supreme Court concluded that the "community"
to be used to judge obscenity under its "contemporary commu-
nity standards" test should be a national community, not a lo-
cal one.50 The Court stated that a local community standard
would have the effect of denying some parts of the country ac-
cess to material it deems acceptable but which other commu-
nities find unacceptable. 5 1 Indeed, because the Due Process
Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 509-10 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
50. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964). Jacobellis managed a
motion picture theater in Cleveland Heights, Ohio. See id. at 184. He was
convicted on two counts of possessing and exhibiting an obscene film in violation
of an Ohio statute. The state appellate and supreme courts both affirmed the
conviction. The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the state
courts properly found the motion picture obscene and thus not entitled to the
protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. The Court held
the picture was not obscene, under a national standard, which the Court held
was the appropriate standard for judging obscenity. See id. at 192-93. The
government argued that the "contemporary community standards" of the Roth
test implied local community standards. See id. at 192. The Court deter-
mined that it should be a national standard, as first stated by Judge Learned
Hand:
Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which is
honestly germane to a pure subject... still I scarcely think that they
would forbid all which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that
society is prepared to accept for its own limitations those which may
perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its memberships... but to
fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fa-
tal policy.
United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Judge Hand was
referring to "community" in the sense of "society at large; ... the public, or
people in general." Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 193 (citing Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary 542 (2d ed. 1949)).
5L See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 193 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380 (1957)). The Court reasoned that even at movie theaters and bookstores
the patrons do not come from merely the small community surrounding the
establishments. See id. at 194. Suppressing the book or film in one locality
would deter its dissemination in other localities where it might not be ob-
scene. See id. Sellers would be reluctant to risk conviction in testing the dif-
ferent standards and such restrictions would limit the public's access to forms
of the printed word that the State could not constitutionally suppress directly.
See id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1960)). Standards vary
from city to city, and there are some cities in Georgia where courts have con-
cluded that R-rated movies are obscene. See Jon Kerr, Civil Libertarians De-
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Clause requires the courts to reconcile the conflicting rights of
local communities, the Court has explicitly refused to tolerate a
result whereby "the constitutional limits of free expression in
the Nation would vary with state lines."
52
2. Miller and Its Progeny: A Local Community Standard
The Supreme Court again redefined the obscenity test in
1973 in Miller v. California.3 Although it recognized that under
a national constitution fundamental First Amendment limita-
tions cannot vary from community to community, the Court
rejected the contention that the "community standard" should
be a uniform national standard.M Instead, it held that courts
should judge obscenity by engaging in a three-step analysis.
First, courts should consider "whether the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards" 55 would find "that
cry 6th Circuit Ruling in Internet Obscenity Case, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Feb.
6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 258349.
52. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 194-95 (1964) (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)). "It is, after all, a national Constitution we are ex-
pounding." Id. at 195.
53. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller conducted a mass mailing of sexually ex-
plicit materials in order to promote book sales. See id. at 16. The defendant
mailed five unsolicited advertising brochures through the mail in an envelope
addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. See id. at 18. The
brochures advertised four books entitled "Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex
Orgies Illustrated," and "An Illustrated History of Pornography," as well as a
film entitled "Marital Intercourse." The brochures contained descriptive
printed material consisting of pictures and drawings that explicitly depicted
men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual ac-
tivities with genitals often prominently displayed. The manager of the res-
taurant, who had not requested the materials, opened the envelope and
complained to the police. See id. Miller was convicted of violating California
Penal Code § 311.2(a) for knowingly distributing obscene material. See id. at
16. Miller appealed, and the appellate court afied the conviction. See id.
at 15.
54. See id. at 30. The Court stated that application of the Miller test is a
question of fact to be decided by a jury in the location where trial is brought.
The Court further stated that the United States is too big and too diverse to
have a single standard. While, the court system historically permits triers of
fact to draw on the standards of their community, requiring states to structure
obscenity proceedings around a national 'community standard' would be im-
practical See id. "People in different States vary in their tastes and atti-
tudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity." Id. at 33.
55. "Community standards" has been defined as follows:
Contemporary community standards are set by what is in fact ac-
cepted in the community as a whole; that is to say, by society at large
or people in general; and not by what some persons or groups of per-
sons may believe the community as a whole ought to accept or refuse
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the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."56
Next, courts should examine "whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law."57 Finally, courts should
evaluate "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 58
According to the Court, this test respects the states' le-
gitimate interest in prohibiting the dissemination of obscene
materials to minors within their borders.5 9 In contrast, the dis-
sent argued that applying a local community standard allowed lo-
cal censorship of speech in violation of the United States Con-
stitution.60  The dissent argued that a local community
standard was unconstitutionally vague.61 The local community
to accept. It is a matter of common knowledge, of which the Court
takes judicial notice, that customs change, and that the community
as a whole may from time to time find acceptable that which was
formerly unacceptable, and not infrequently may find presently ac-
ceptable that which some particular group of the population may re-
gard as an unacceptable appeal to prurient interest.
In determining contemporary community standards, the jury may
consider what, as shown by the evidence in the case, appears in con-
temporary magazines, books, newspapers, television, motion pictures,
novels and other media of communication that are freely available in
the community as a whole.
2 DEVIrr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL §
40A.07 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997). In United States v. Battista, the Sixth
Circuit approved use of this jury instruction regarding community standards.
See 646 F.2d 237, 245 (6th Cir. 1981).
56. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(1972) (quoting Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 18-20. "The States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting
dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemina-
tion carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwill-
ing recipients or of exposure to juveniles." Id. at 18-19 (citing Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969), and other cases supporting the proposi-
tion).
60. See id. at 41, 44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent argued the
Miller test makes it possible to ban any paper, journal, or magazine in a par-
ticular place. See id. The dissent stated:
The idea that the First Amendment permits punishment for ideas
that are "offensive" to the particular judge or jury sitting in judgment
is astounding. No greater leveler of speech or literature has ever
been designed. To give the power to the censor, as we do today, is to
make a sharp and radical break with the traditions of a free society.
Id. at 44.
61. The dissent cited Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), as
a demonstration of the unconstitutionality of the Miller test. See Miller, 413
U.S. at 45 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Coates, the court struck down a stat-
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standard was unascertainable because "[clonduct that annoys
some people does not annoy others."62
The Fifth Amendment provides that In]o person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...... The Supreme Court of the United States has in-
terpreted this to mean in part that such deprivation must be
preceded by fair warning . ' Therefore, an enactment must be
specific about its prohibitions if it is to provide fair warning to
would-be violators. Due process requires that "an enactment is
void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined."65
The basic principal of fair warning is that a person of ordinary
intelligence must have a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited. 6 Furthermore, in order to prevent discrimina-
tory enforcement, laws must provide specific standards for
those who apply them. 7 Finally, a vague law inhibits basic
First Amendment freedoms because people will avoid testing the
ill-defined boundaries of the law.68 Related to vagueness is the
doctrine of overbreadth. A statute is overbroad if it encompasses
conduct constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.69
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Miller test in Hamling v. United States. ° In Hamling, the de-
fendants challenged convictions for mailing and conspiring to
ute dictating that "[i]f three or more people meet together on a sidewalk or
street corner, they must conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police offi-
cer or other person who should happen to pass by." Id. (quoting Coates, 402
U.S. at 614). The Court found the statute to be unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it subjected people to an unascertainable standard noting "[c]onduct
that annoys some people does not annoy others." Id. (quoting Coates, 402 U.S.
at 614). Therefore, the dissent concluded that the Court in Miller impermis-
sibly allowed California to punish people who publish materials offensive to
some but not offensive to others. See id. at 46.
62. Id. (quoting Coates, 402 U.S. at 614).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64- See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985) (interpreting the Due Process Clause).
65. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
66. See id. Vague laws trap the innocent by not providing fair warning of
what is prohibited. See id.
67. See id. A vague law is delegated to judges, police officers, and juries
for enforcement on a subjective basis. See id. at 108-09. A vague law provides
for arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law. See id. at 109.
68. See id. at 109. "Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer
far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden ar-
eas were clearly marked." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
69. See id. at 114. Overbroad statutes unconstitutionally deter privileged
activity. See id.
70. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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mail an obscene advertising brochure with sexually explicit
photographic materials.71 Rejecting the defendants' argument
that a national community standard should have been ap-
plied,72 the Court affirmed the convictions and upheld the local
community standard. The Court reasoned that a juror is enti-
tled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average
person in the community in determining what is obscene.
3
The Court also stated the district court was free to admit evi-
dence of standards existing in places outside the forum district
if such evidence would help decide the issue.7
The dissent argued the appropriate standard was a national
one because of the nature of the distribution of the product.75
The majority's test required national distributors sending their
products in interstate travel to be familiar with the community
standards of every community to which they send their goods.76
Because these standards are impossible to discern, the dis-
tributors must inevitably conform to the lowest standard that
satisfies the First Amendment.77 Hence, "the people of many
communities will be 'protected' far beyond governments constitu-
tional power to deny them access to sexually oriented materials.""
71. See id. at 87. The defendants mailed a book entitled "The Illustrated
Presidential Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography" and an
advertisement through the mail. See id. at 91. The defendants mailed the
advertisement to approximately 55,000 people throughout the United States.
See id. at 92. The advertisement contained photographs from the Illustrated
Report. See id. The full page of pictures portrayed intercourse, sodomy, and
fellatio. See id. at 93. The indictment charged the defendants under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, and 1461. See id. at 91. Section 1461 states, "whoever
knowingly uses the mails for the mailing... of anything declared by this sec-
tion. . . to be non-mailable" commits a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1461. The appellate
court affirmed the conviction. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 92.
72. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104 (stating that appellants misunderstood
the Miller Court's holdings).
73. See id. at 104.
74. See id. at 106. Courts have also tailored the standard to comply with
the specific community affected. For instance, military courts apply a military
community standard, thereby recognizing community beliefs based upon a
nongeographic form of community. See United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J.
568, 581 (A.F. Crim. App. 1995) (recognizing validity of military community
standard).
75. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. See id. (noting that subjecting a national distributor to any commu-
nity's standards will lead to "debilitating self-censorship that abridges the
First Amendment rights of the people").
78. Id.
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In 1989, the United States Supreme Court extended the
local community standard established in Miller to a case in-
volving telephone distribution of pornographic services.7 9 In
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, the defendant
offered sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages
across the country. 0 The government prosecuted the defen-
dant under a federal statute that imposed a prohibition on in-
decent or obscene interstate commercial telephone messages.81
The defendant argued that the federal statute and the Miller
test created a national standard of obscenity by forcing the de-
fendant to tailor its messages to the least tolerant commu-
nity.82 The Court rejected this contention because the defen-
dant was able to tailor its messages on a selective basis to the
communities it chose to serve.83 The dissent argued the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it completely banned
obscene telephone messages when the government interest was
limited to protecting minors.84
In United States v. Peraino, however, the Sixth Circuit
overturned a conviction for distributing obscene materials under
18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465.85 The Court stated that a defendant
must know of distribution into a particular community in order
79. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26
(1989).
80. See id. at 117-18. Defendant used special phone lines designed to
handle a large volume of calls simultaneously. See id. at 118. The defendants
charged those who called a special fee. The fee was collected by the phone
company and distributed to the defendant. See id. A typical prerecorded
message lasted from 30 seconds to two minutes and could be called by up to
50,000 people hourly through a single phone number. See id. at 118 n.1. Ad-
ditionally, the defendants were able to determine where the telephone calls
were coming from. See id. at 118.
81. See id. at 118.
82. See id. at 124.
83. See id. at 125. The Court further stated that while the defendant may
incur some costs in developing and implementing such a system, there is no
constitutional barrier to a law that imposes those costs. See id. The defen-
dant could "hire operators to determine the source of the calls" or contract
"with the phone company to arrange for screening and blocking of out-of-area
calls." Id.
84- See id. at 134 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent,
banning obscene materials to adults is unconstitutional. See id. at 133. The
compelling government interest is protecting children from exposure to por-
nographic material. Steps can be taken to ensure minors cannot access the
messages, and thus the statute should only ban interstate telephone messages
to minors. See id. at 134.
85. See United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 549,554 (6th Cir. 1981).
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to be convicted.86 In Peraino, the defendant acquired the dis-
tribution rights after the obscene film had already been dis-
tributed in Tennessee.87
3. Venue in Obscenity Cases
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Bagnell,
held venue for federal obscenity prosecutions lies "in any district
from, through, or into which" allegedly obscene material moves.88
The court reasoned the United States Constitution guarantees de-
fendants the right to be tried in the state and judicial district in
which the alleged crime occurred.89 The use of common carriers to
ship obscene materials between states is a continuing offense that
occurs in every judicial district which the material touches.90
Therefore, the court concluded that jurisdiction is permissible in
any district through which the material passes.91
I. UNITED STATES V. THOMAS
A. AFFRMING THE LOCAL STANDARD
In United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals became the first appellate court to consider whether the
86. See id. at 552. The Peraino court framed its analysis in terms of proof
needed for conviction on a charge of conspiracy to distribute obscenity. See id.
at 551. The Thomas court, however, did not discuss any difference between
conspiracy to distribute obscenity, as was present in Peraino, and the actual
distribution of obscenity with which the Thomases were charged. See United
States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74
(1996). Therefore, neither does this Comment.
87. See Peraino, 645 F.2d at 549.
88. See United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830-32 (11th Cir. 1982)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237).
89. See id. at 830 (citing United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 198-99 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
90. See id. (citing Reed Enterprises v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372, 380
(D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), af/'d mem., 390 U.S. 457 (1968)). The de-
fendant in Bagnell, a California resident, shipped adult movies into Florida.
See id. at 829. He was convicted of two counts of common carrier use for the
interstate transportation of obscene material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462
and two counts of interstate transportation of obscene material for purposes
of sale and distribution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465. See id. The defen-
dant actively sought to distribute obscene videos throughout the United
States. See id. The defendant argued that venue was improper in Florida be-
cause the government was able to engage in forum shopping by choosing
where to order the films. See id. at 830. The court ruled that venue was
proper in Florida. See id. at 832-33.
91. See id. at 832.
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geographic limitlessness of the Internet required a national
standard rather than a local one for assessing the materials'
obscene nature under the "contemporary community stan-
dards" portion of the Miller test.92 The court held the local
Tennessee community standard was the proper standard.93
In reaching this conclusion, the court invoked venue
rules,94 finding that issues of venue correspond to the determi-
nation of which community standard to apply.95 As the court
stated, "venue for federal obscenity prosecutions is proper 'in
any district from, through, or into which' the allegedly obscene
material moves." 6 The court observed that the AABBS al-
lowed members in other jurisdictions to access and download
GIF files, which were then electronically transmitted in inter-
state commerce. 97 The court concluded prosecution was proper
in either the district of dispatch or the district of receipt and
thus venue was proper in either California or Tennessee. 98 The
92. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996); see also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text
(defining material as obscene when the "average person applying contemporary
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest). On appeal, the Thomases asserted that their convictions
violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech. See Thomas, 74
F.3d at 710. The defendants also asserted their conduct did not constitute a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465 because the statute did not apply to intangible
objects such as the computer GIF files and Congress did not intend to regulate
computer transmissions. See id. at 706. In addition, the Thomases argued
that venue was improper, see id. at 709; they had a constitutionally protected
right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of their home, see id. at 710;
jury instructions given during trial were improper, see id. at 712; evidence was
improperly admitted, see id. at 714; they had incompetent counsel, see id. at
715; and sentencing was improper, see id. at 716.
93. See id. at 711.
94. See id. (stating that the issues of venue and community standards are
tied together).
95. See id.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir.
1981) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237)). Federal obscenity laws generally involve acts
in more than one jurisdiction due to their inherent nexus to interstate com-
merce. See id. at 709. The court stated there was not a '"constitutional im-
pediment to the governmenefs power to prosecute pornography dealers in any
district into which the material is sent.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Bag-
nell, 679 F.2d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 1982)). Many obscenity cases are brought in
Tennessee, where strict community standards exist. See, e.g., United States
v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1981) (bringing prosecution for obscenity in
Tennessee); United States v. Toushin, 714 F. Supp. 1452 (M.D. Tenn. 1989)
(bringing prosecution for obscenity in Tennessee).
97. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
98. See id. at 711 (citing Bagnell, 679 F.2d at 830-31); see also supra notes
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court further reasoned that cases involving interstate trans-
portation of obscene material should apply the community
standards of the geographic area where prosecution is brought,
which in this case was Tennessee. 9 The court observed that
federal courts have refused to declare that it is unconstitu-
tional to subject interstate distributors of obscenity to varying
community standards. 0
B. INTERNET'S INTERSTATE DISTRIBUTION UNDER THE
COMMUNITY STANDARD
In reaching its holding, the Thomas court refused to ad-
dress the defendants' claim that the uniqueness of the Internet
required a new definition of "community" that takes into ac-
count the geographic limitlessness of the Internet. 0' Citing
Sable, the court dismissed this argument. 02 The court noted
88-90 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Bagnell).
The court noted that its holding "may result in prosecutions of persons in a
community" to which the materials were sent even though the community
from which they were sent would not have found them obscene. See Thomas,
74 F.3d at 711 (quoting Peraino, 645 F.2d at 551).
99. See id. (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 125 (1989); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15, 30-34 (1973)).
100. See id. (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106; United States v. Sandy, 605
F.2d 210, 217 (6th Cir. 1979)).
101. See id. at 711. The defendants argued that the computer technology
used in this case required a new definition of "community" based on the
"broad-ranging connections among people in cyberspace," instead of the geo-
graphic locale of the federal judicial district of the trial. Id. The defendants
argued that "[w]ithout a more flexible definition... there will be an imper-
missible chill on protected speech because BBS operators cannot select who
gets the materials they make available on their bulletin boards." Id. Therefore,
BBS operators would be forced to censor their materials to the community
with the most restrictive obscenity standards. See id.
102. See id. (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 125-26). The court dismissed this
argument, stating that the defendants in this case had control over the juris-
dictions where materials were distributed for downloading or printing. See id.
However, in another case related to obscenity and the Internet, one judge
has stated:
As the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the In-
ternet deserves the highest protection from governmental intrusion.
True it is that many find some of the speech on the Internet to be of-
fensive, and amid the din of cyberspace many hear discordant voices
they regard as indecent. The absence of governmental regulation of
Internet content has unquestionably produced a kind of chaos ....
Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our
liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered
speech the First Amendment protects.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.),
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the Sable court's finding that distributors of obscene materials
may be subjected to varying community standards, but that the
distributor 'was free to tailor its messages, on a selective ba-
sis... to the communities it chooses to serve.' 103 The court
also stated that additional costs were not a constitutional im-
pediment.1°4 Specifically, the court determined the defendants
in Thomas had knowledge and control over the jurisdictions
where materials were distributed. 10 5 Defendants knew that the
member in question was from Memphis, Tennessee because the
AABBS had limited membership and required signed paper
applications with members' addresses and phone numbers.
10 6
Consequently, the court concluded the defendants had the
means to limit access in jurisdictions where obscenity standards
were lower than in California.107 The court concluded that de-
fendants should have refused membership to the Memphis
member if they did not choose to be subject to the obscenity
standards of Tennessee. 108 Therefore, the court determined
that a new definition of "community" for use in obscenity
prosecutions involving electronic bulletin boards was unneces-
sary in this case. 0 9
III. REDEFINING COMMUNITY STANDARDS IN LIGHT
OF THE GEOGRAPHIC LIMITLESSNESS OF THE
INTERNET
Future courts should reject the approach taken in United
States v. Thomas because the Thomas court improperly relied
affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
103. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 125). See su-
pra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the court's holding and
reasoning in Sable). The defendants in Thomas argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1465
did not apply to intangible objects like computer files, citing United States v.
Carlin Communications, Inc., 815 F.2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 1987), as the
relevant precedent. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706. The court stated that
"telephonic communication of pre-recorded sexually suggestive comments or
proposals... is inherently different from the obscene computer-generated
materials that were electronically transmitted from California to Tennessee."
Id. at 707.
104. Id. at 712 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 125).
105. See id. at 711.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 712. The court stated it is a cardinal rule to "never reach
constitutional questions not squarely presented by the facts of a case." Id.
(citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985)).
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on distinguishable precedent in upholding the defendants'
convictions. The court failed to consider the uniqueness of the
Internet."' The court also did not account for the shortcomings
of applying the existing standard to Internet cases, which re-
sults in a lowest-common-denominator approach as well as fo-
rum shopping by federal prosecutors. The proper "community"
for the purpose of the Internet should be one applicable to all
users of the Internet, where the members of the Internet com-
munity define what constitutes obscenity. A standard de-
signed specifically for the unique nature and attributes of the
Internet would further the policy of prohibiting obscenity in
conformance with past precedent and would uphold the consti-
tutional rights of free speech and due process.
A. THE THOMAS COURT'S RELIANCE ON PAST PRECEDENT WAS
INAPPROPRIATE
1. Bagnell, Miller, and Hamling Are Clearly Distinguishable
on Their Facts
In arriving at its holding, the Thomas court improperly
relied upon precedent set forth in Bagnell, Miller, and Ham-
ling."' The court cited Bagnell for the proposition that venue
was proper in Tennessee,112 and Miller for the proposition that
community standards were to be determined by the community
where the trial took place.'13 Citing Hamling as authority, the
court then concluded that because venue was proper in Ten-
nessee, Tennessee's community standards were proper for as-
sessing the obscenity of the material."4 Unfortunately, the
Thomas court extended the principles of Bagnell, Miller, and
Hamling to an inapplicable fact situation.
In Bagnell, the defendant actively sought purchasers of
obscenity throughout the United States, and used a common
carrier to ship the obscene materials interstate." 5 Similarly, in
Miller and Hamling, the defendants purposely sent obscene
materials nationwide. 16 In these cases, the communities involved
had a right to judge the appropriate behavior for their commu-
110. See supra notes 13, 109 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 53, 71.
874 [Vol. 82:855
1998] INTERNET COMMUNITY STANDARDS 875
nity, and to hold those that purposely avail themselves of their
communities liable for inappropriate actions, because their com-
munities were actually targeted by the respective defendants.
In contrast to these cases where the defendants sent ma-
terials into communities, the defendants in Thomas did not ac-
tually solicit sales from or send anything into Tennessee.
117
The postal inspector logged into defendant's bulletin board system
in California, scanned the information, and then selectively
downloaded pictures into Tennessee.'18 Significantly, it was
the federal agent who purposely availed himself of the Tennessee
community, not the defendant.
In addition, the government can only prosecute bulletin
board operators when they knowingly distribute materials to
those communities.'19 Unlike Miller and Hamling where the
defendants purposely sent obscene materials into the commu-
nities, the Thomas defendants merely approved an application
for access to their bulletin board system from a Tennessee
resident. 120 Approval of a paper application that allows access
to the bulletin board is not distribution of obscenity. It is the
Tennessee resident who crosses into California, views the files,
and then downloads them to Tennessee. Consequently, the de-
fendants did not knowingly distribute the materials into Ten-
nessee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465, but instead they
knowingly provided a Tennessee resident with access to their
California bulletin board.'2 ' In addition, they did not distrib-
ute the materials into Tennessee. It was the postal inspector
who downloaded the files into Tennessee. Unlike Bagnell,
Miller, and Hamling, the facts of the Thomas case fail to fall
within the statute's language of "knowingly" and "transports."
2. Sable is Distinguishable from Thomas
The Thomas court also improperly relied upon Sable in de-
termining that a new definition of "community" was not re-
117. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing method of dis-
tribution involved in the Thomas case).
118. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 5-7 and
accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing the
"Iknowledge" requirement of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465).
120. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
121. Unlike the Thomases, most modern day bulletin board operators do
not approve physical applications to grant access to their systems. In such a
situation, the lower level of knowledge on the part of the bulletin board opera-
tors further supports this argument.
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quired. 22 The Sable court found a telephone service liable
even though the telephone service received phone calls from all
over the country. 123 The Sable court stated the telephone service
could feasibly screen out those calls and apply the differing
community standards to the service they offered.'24 In Sable,
the telephone operators knew where the telephone calls had
originated.12 The telephone service could have easily blocked
calls from certain jurisdictions by screening for area codes or
prefixes. 126
In contrast, the bulletin board operator does not typically
know from what jurisdiction the user is accessing. 127 More im-
portantly, the operator cannot block out access from certain ar-
eas.'28 The Internet exists without physical boundaries and
without a central governing authority. Access can be gained
from a multitude of different points. 129 In the instant case, the
postal inspector's application was sent from Tennessee,130 but
the bulletin board operator did not know from where the user
was accessing or to where the user was downloading. The user
could access the bulletin board from anywhere in the country
as well as download to anywhere in the country. For example,
if the user had a home-page on a server in a different state, as
is typical with on-line service companies, the user could down-
load the files to that server for later access by others. The files
would never come in contact with Tennessee, other than
through the user viewing those files on-line. In Sable, by con-
trast, the telephone operators always knew where the phone
call originated and could block out certain areas. Because
bulletin board operators do not know from what jurisdiction
the user is accessing and cannot block out access from certain
areas, a different definition of "community" is needed.
Although the Thomas court based its decision on Sable, it
also acknowledged that "telephonic communication of pre-
recorded sexually suggestive comments or proposals.., is in-
122. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 80.
126. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 30-32 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Internet
community).
130. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing postal inspec-
tor's access point).
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herently different from the obscene computer-generated materials
that were electronically transmitted from California to Tennes-
see."'31 The inherent differences exist in the method of trans-
mission, in the subject matter of the materials, and in the
amount of control the supplier has over the purchaser. Despite
noting these inherent differences, the court nevertheless relied
upon Sable, and reached erroneous conclusions.
B. THOMAS AND PAST PRECEDENT Do NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE
UNIQUENESS OF THE INTERNET
The "contemporary community standards" test, as defined
in Miller, is both vague and hard to apply, even to traditional
modes of publication and distribution. Community standards
vary from one locality to the next. 32 Indeed, due to the vague-
ness of this test, opponents have claimed the test is an uncon-
stitutional violation of the Due Process Clause.133 The thrust of
this argument rests on the ambiguous language of the statutes
and the unclear definition of "community." Neither the words
in the statutes nor the definition of community are sufficiently
precise because they have different meanings for different
people and communities. Nevertheless, courts have tradi-
tionally rejected this argument in the context of traditional
forms of distribution of obscene materials because the Consti-
tution only requires sufficient warning as to the proscribed
conduct, and suppliers who knowingly distribute obscene ma-
terials into different jurisdictions have sufficient warning as to
the proscribed conduct in those jurisdictions. 13 4
With the proliferation of the Internet, the due process ar-
gument has new validity, at the very least within the limited
context of the Internet. The subjection of bulletin board opera-
tors to community standards in the local community where the
users reside and where the supplier did not knowingly distrib-
ute materials violates the Due Process Clause and suppresses
free speech under the First Amendment.13 5 Unlike the tradi-
131. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 707 (distinguishing Thomas
from United States v. Carlin Communications, Inc., 815 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir.
1987), which involved the use of sexually suggestive recordings accessible by
telephone).
132. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing void for
vagueness doctrine).
134- See supra note 42.
135. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing due process
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tional forms of distribution, the Internet has no geographic
boundaries. 136 With users from all over the world, the bulletin
board operators do not know the identity or location of indi-
viduals accessing or downloading files from their system.'37
Subjecting the operators to varying community standards under
these conditions requires an impossible determination by the
operators as to which communities are accessing their bulletin
boards and which community standards should apply. There-
fore, the statute does not provide sufficient warning to bulletin
board operators as required by the Due Process Clause. The
Thomas court, however, ignores this aspect of the Internet and
its dissimilarity to traditional media.
38
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXISTING TEST
1. Lowest-Common-Denominator Approach
A local community standard leads to the lowest-common-
denominator approach, whereby distributors market only ma-
terial that conforms to the standards of the most sensitive
community.1 39 This standard creates a de facto national standard
that chills freedom of speech. Because Internet distributors
cannot tailor material specifically for each jurisdiction, they
are forced to tailor material to be appropriate for the least tol-
erant jurisdiction. This result uniquely affects bulletin board
operators because, unlike mass mailing distributors who know
which jurisdictions are receiving the materials, bulletin board
operators do not know which jurisdictions are accessing their
systems.
This lowest-common-denominator approach allows the
community with the least tolerance for obscenity to set the
standard for the rest of the nation. Further, while the least
tolerant community consists of many different people, only a
portion of them are Internet users. Consequently, this ap-
proach allows non-Internet users in the most conservative ju-
risdiction of the country to force their values not only upon the
rest of the country, but also upon the world-wide community of
requirements).
136. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the structure of
the Internet).
137. See supra text accompanying note 27.
138. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117S. Ct. 74 (1996).
139. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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Internet users. For example, the defendants in the instant
case would be forced to tailor the material on their bulletin
board to Tennessee's strict standards. The result is that the
residents of Tennessee, many of whom are not Internet users,
have set a de facto standard for the rest of the nation's Internet
users. This imposition amounts to legal censorship in violation
of the First Amendment because adults in more tolerant com-
munities have been denied access to their constitutionally pro-
tected right to view materials that their communities do not
find obscene.14 °
The lowest-common-denominator result was never in-
tended by Judge Learned Hand, who first verbalized the com-
munity standards test.141 Judge Hand stated explicitly that
society is not prepared to "accept for its own limitations those
which may perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its mem-
bers.., but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and
least capable seems a fatal policy."42 Judge Hand was refer-
ring to the "community" in the sense of "society at large;.., the
public, or people in general."143 Therefore, the relevant com-
munity standard should be the Internet "society at large," not
the least tolerant community.
2. Federal Obscenity Statutes and Definition of "Community"
Are Overbroad
The federal obscenity statutes and definitions are also
overbroad in violation of the Due Process Clause. The compelling
governmental interest that allows these statutes to overcome
the First Amendment protections is in protecting minors from
exposure to pornographic material. 1" The varying community
standards, however, not only prohibit access by minors, but
also by adults. Statutes and definitions must be narrowly tai-
lored to address the government's compelling interest without
overly restricting an individual's constitutional rights.1 45
140. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
14L See supra note 50 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Learned
Hand on a national community standard).
142. United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
143. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964); see also supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
144. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the govern-
ment's interest in banning obscene materials).
145. See supra notes 69, 84 and accompanying text (discussing overbreadth
and constitutionally protected conduct under the First Amendment).
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Courts have previously rejected this overbreadth argu-
ment, but in a different context. In Sable, the Court rejected
this argument because the defendant knew from which juris-
dictions the telephone callers were calling and could effectively
block out those areas. 146 Thus, the court held the statute was
not overbroad." 7 In Thomas and similar cases involving the
Internet, the bulletin board operators cannot effectively block
out certain areas. In fact, the bulletin boards can be accessed
world-wide. 148 Therefore, in this context, the statutes are over-
broad. The statutes not only protect minors from access to
pornographic materials, but the statutes also unconstitution-
ally deny adults access to those materials, because the bulletin
board operators must tailor their bulletin boards to the least
tolerant community. This unconstitutionally denies adults in
areas with more tolerant communities access to materials that
they have a constitutional right to view.
3. Forum Shopping by Prosecutors
The local community standard approach provides an op-
portunity for forum shopping on the part of federal prosecutors.
Federal prosecutors are free to bring suit anywhere that materials
have been distributed.149 As in Thomas, prosecutors access the
bulletin boards from the jurisdictions with the least tolerant
standards,15 ° allowing them to bring suit in the district where
they have the best chance of obtaining a conviction.151 This
practice violates the Due Process Clause, since defendants
have a right to a criminal trial in the jurisdiction where the of-
fense occurred. 52 In the instant case, the offense did not occur
in Tennessee; defendants merely posted the files on their com-
puter in California. 5 3
In Thomas, the obscene materials were posted in Califor-
nia. However, the postal inspector accessed the system from
146. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the Sable
Coures reasoning).
147. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 25-26.
149. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing venue for fed-
eral obscenity cases).
150. See supra note 96 (discussing obscenity cases brought in Tennessee).
151. See supra note 98-99 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 89 (discussing constitutional limits of venue in crimi-
nal cases).
153. Cf supra notes 85-87 (discussing parallel analysis regarding "knowledge"
requirement).
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Tennessee, allowing suit to be brought there to take advantage
of Tennessee's less tolerant obscenity standard. 54 Under the
holding in Thomas, prosecutors have the right to prosecute in
any jurisdiction they select. 5 This violates the Due Process
Clause because the defendants do not have notice of the juris-
dictions in which they may be held liable for their postings.
15 6
If one commits an offense in California, one has fair warning
that he will be prosecuted according to California's laws. If
prosecutors are allowed to prosecute from any jurisdiction that
the Internet touches, however, defendants do not have fair
warning as to where they may be held liable.
IV. THE PROPER COMMUNITY STANDARD IS A
STANDARD DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY FOR TUE UNIQUE
NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE INTERNET
A. THE PROPOSED STANDARD
The proper community standard for purposes of the Inter-
net should be a standard designed specifically for the unique
nature and attributes of the Internet. This standard would
apply only to the Internet domain, and Internet users would
determine what is considered obscene material for purposes of
the Internet. The users of the Internet would comprise the
community for the community standards test. Implicit in the
community standards approach is the notion that a community
relies upon the proximity of its members. 5 7 Computer tech-
nologies allow individuals to create unique communities of
people who share similar interests and who wish to communi-
cate with each other about those interests. These communities
have no geographical boundaries' 58 and should not be judged
by communities with geographical boundaries. Internet users
communicate with other users from all over the world from the
privacy of their own home. These users are often more con-
nected to each other than they are to their physical neighbors.
Consequently, these citizens of the Internet community should
determine what is obscene for citizens of the Internet. This
154. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing the postal in-
spector's methods of gathering evidence against the Thomases).
155. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (reviewing the Thomas
court's reasoning regarding proper venue).
156. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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proposed standard would further the policy of prohibiting ob-
scenity in conformance with past precedent and uphold the
constitutional rights of free speech and due process.
B. THE PROPOSED STANDARD IS SUPERIOR TO A LOcAL
STANDARD
A standard designed specifically for Internet users elimi-
nates any vagueness due to ambiguity. Unlike the local com-
munity standard, bulletin board operators would know the
standard applicable to the entire Internet and could effectively
tailor the content of their bulletin boards to conform to that
standard. The operators would not need to know from where
the users were accessing and would not need technology to
block out certain jurisdictions. In conformance with the Due
Process Clause, the proposed standard provides a clearer, more
precise standard for what is acceptable over the Internet.
The proposed standard also conforms to past precedent.
The courts have traditionally refused to tolerate a result
whereby "the constitutional limits of free expression in the
Nation would vary with state -lines."159 The Miller justification
for a local community standard was that the nation was too ex-
pansive and too diverse to expect a single standard.160 This lo-
cal standard was implemented because, at the time, communi-
ties all over the country had different tastes and values. 161
These different communities do not exist on the Internet. All
of the users are part of the same community. Furthermore,
with modern technology, people communicate and interact with
other people from all over the country instantaneously as if the
country were one single community, thereby diminishing the
past perceived need for local community standards.
In failing to recognize the uniqueness of the Internet, the
Thomas court also failed to use the Federal Jury Instructions,
which define community as "society at large" or "people in gen-
eral," which in this case would be the Internet community. 162
The Sixth Circuit approved use of these federal jury instruc-
tions in United States v. Battista 63 The Thomas court should
159. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95 (1964) (quoting Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
160. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (quoting federal jury in-
struction for community standards).
163. 646 F.2d 237, 245 (6th Cir. 1981).
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have utilized this definition and existing precedent to create a
new standard for defining obscenity on the Internet. The pro-
posed standard is consistent with the "society at large" defini-
tion of "community."
This proposed standard would eliminate the least common
denominator effect and forum shopping by prosecutors. With
one standard for everyone accessing the Internet, users of the
Internet would determine what is obscene, rather than the lo-
cal communities with the least tolerant standards. In addition,
federal prosecutors would not be able to choose where to prose-
cute based on the most favorable local standards. Prosecutors
could still bring suit anywhere the materials passed, with
proper venue, but the proposed standard would be the same in
each and every jurisdiction.
The local jury would be instructed regarding the proposed
standard, including the nature of the Internet, pornography
standards on the Internet, ability to prohibit access, and any
other pertinent information. This could be accomplished by
presenting expert witness testimony, or possibly physical evi-
dence, as to what standard applies to the Internet community.
Judicial precedent is in place to support the proposed
standard. The Hamling court stated that the district court was
free to admit evidence of standards existing in places outside of
the forum district if such evidence would help decide the is-
sue.'6" Other courts have recognized the practicality and valid-
ity of community defined by nongeographic factors.'65
C. THE PROPOSED STANDARD MAINTAINS PROPER BALANCE
'BETWEEN LEGiTIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH
This proposed standard also fits within the language of the
federal obscenity statutes and within the states' legitimate in-
terest of protecting minors from exposure to pornographic ma-
terial.166  The obscenity statutes require the violator to
"knowingly distribute" obscene materials. Under the local
community standard, bulletin board operators do not
"knowingly distribute" materials into varying jurisdictions. 167
164. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (recognizing the validity of
military community standard).
166. See supra notes 8, 84 and accompanying text (discussing statute lan-
guage and governmenefs interest).
167. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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Rather, the users transport the obscene materials into the
varying jurisdictions. By applying the proposed standard,
however, the bulletin board operators could be held liable for
"knowingly distributing" obscene materials to the Internet
community. Furthermore, the proposed standard conforms to
the government's interest in protecting children from exposure
to obscene material. Minors can still be banned from access to
the bulletin board systems while providing adults with access
to the obscene material across the entire country.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit held the local
Tennessee community standard was the proper standard for
determining what was obscene material under 18 U.S.C. §
1465. The court improperly relied upon precedent inapplicable
to the facts of this case and upheld the convictions of the de-
fendants. The court also failed to consider the policy behind
that precedent and erroneously applied it to the unique Inter-
net environment.
This Comment asserts that "contemporary community
standards" for purposes of the Internet should be redefined
specifically for the unique nature and attributes of the Internet.
Bulletin board operators are often unaware of users' locations
and are not the distributors of the materials. Furthermore, the
community at hand is made up of users from all over the world
with instant access to the materials. The users of the Internet
should comprise the community for purposes of defining what
is obscene material on the Internet. This proposed standard
upholds the constitutional guarantees of free speech and due
process while protecting the states' legitimate interest in pro-
tecting minors from exposure to pornographic materials.
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